Exhibit 2

From: Ahmad Chatila <AChatila@sunedison.com>
Sent: Saturday, April 09, 2016 3:43 PM
To: Manny Hernandez; Georganne Proctor; Martin Truong; Tony Alvarez; Jim Williams; Randy Zwirn; Clayton Daley
Subject: Fwd: IMPORTANT from WSJ

There is a chance that this reporter has access to material that Paul Hastings and FTI has. If that is true, she might have access to such material from whomever have access to such analysis.

Who has access from few days ago?

Begin forwarded message:

From: Ross Lovern <ross.lovern@kekst.com>
Date: April 9, 2016 at 8:25:34 AM PDT
To: "AChatila@sunedison.com" <AChatila@sunedison.com>, Tamara Mullings <tmullings@sunedison.com>, Martin Truong <MTruong@sunedison.com>, "Ivester, J. Eric" <Eric.Ivester@skadden.com>, "Li, Annie Z" <Annie.Li@skadden.com>, "Mark_Hojnacki@mckinsey.com" <Mark_Hojnacki@mckinsey.com>, Gordon Handelsman <ghandelsman@sunedison.com>, 'Phelps Morris' <PMorris@sunedison.com>
Cc: Ruth Pachman <ruth.pachman@kekst.com>
Subject: FW: IMPORTANT from WSJ

Sharing the below with this group as an FYI at Tamara's request.

From: Ruth Pachman
Sent: Saturday, April 9, 2016 8:52 AM
To: Ivester, J. Eric <Eric.Ivester@skadden.com>; Li, Annie Z <Annie.Li@skadden.com>; Tamara Mullings <tmullings@sunedison.com>; Martin Truong <MTruong@sunedison.com>
Cc: Kekst-Sune <Kekst-Sune@kekst.com>
Subject: IMPORTANT from WSJ

As you will see in more detail below, the WSJ is working on a major front page story – 2,000 words – to run the day after the filing. The reporter, Liz Hoffman, wants to make sure the company understands the "highly sensitive" nature of what will appear and that it as Ahmad and Brian have a chance to respond. She also would like to fact check, and has sent a highly detailed set of assertions and statements to review. I told her I doubted we could be responsive to any of it but would make sure the right people were aware of the story. She had been unable to reach Ben and so she reached out to me.

It's worth reading through her email as it gives a very clear sense of the story and how problematic it is. I would just add that she described it to me as the "rise and fall" of SunEdison and her contention that, while there were many external factors that led to the current situation (bad timing, market forces, oil prices, interest rates) there were just as many internal factors, and that they included "highly questionable" actions such as "value transfer" and "misleading public statements" about cash flow and liquidity. She says the story is "deeply sourced" from individuals and from Board minutes.

She said that this is not the first time the company has run out of money, but that in the past markets always bailed them out. "This time they were not forgiving." The story puts particular emphasis on last October, November, and December and focuses on "where money was moving around" at that time. She mentioned in that context disclosures to the second lien.

She understands that Sunday night is the likely time for filing, and, if that is the case, the story would appear in Tuesday's paper.

I have copied only a few people on this email. You will see that given the nature of the assertions she is also asking specifically for, at a minimum, a decline comment from Ahmad and Brian as individuals in addition to a decline comment from the company. I have not copied either of them here. Eric, Martin, and Tamara – I will look to you for guidance on how best to inform them or interact with them on this piece. She says her deadline is noon tomorrow. Tamara – I have not copied Phelps or Gordon, but can let them know if you so advise.

I can decline comment for all concerned or, alternatively, say that the company declines comment but that I can't speak for individuals and couldn't reach them. Of course, if there are things we want to correct or engage on, we can always do so on background.

Thank you. Her email follows in two pieces.

From: Liz Hoffman [mailto:liz.hoffman@wsj.com]
Sent: Friday, April 8, 2016 9:36 PM
To: Ruth Pachman <ruth.pachman@kekst.com>
Subject: SUNE fact check

Hi Ruth,

Sorry for the delay. I want to make sure SunEdison knows we are going to make the following points in our story. Our reporting comes from interviews with dozens of people familiar with matter; regulatory and court filings; and SunEdison's public statements and presentations.

I'm also asking for interviews with or comment from Ahmad and Brian. I understand they may not want to speak, but I need to be able to tell an editor that they declined through a spokesperson or that the company declined to make them available, if that's the case. The same goes for Manny Hernandez and Georganne Proctor. I'm also asking if you'd make any other board members or senior executives available for an interview.

I've tried to organize this thematically. Please get back to me with any answers, comments, or points of discussion noon on Sunday. I know it's likely to be a busy weekend for you all, but I did reach out Thursday night, which I think is ample notice.

I'm available all weekend on my cell phone at 917-634-0046.

Thanks,
Liz

Transition from MEMC to SUNE

- In 2013, MEMC was struggling in part because of competition from Chinese solar-panel makers.
- It pivoted to focus on solar development. It announced the spinoff of its semiconductor business and began searching for projects to buy.
- To help finance its acquisitions, it launched TerraForm
- The IPO was more than 20 times oversubscribed
- TerraForm allowed SunEdison to finance more acquisitions by creating a buyer for its projects as they were completed or by buying already-operating assets included in the acquisitions.

As SunEdison grew, acquisitions were sometimes struck with little due diligence, at prices some deemed too high, and over the objections of division heads.

- Senior executives argued against buying Mark Group last summer but Mr. Chatila authorized the purchase. After the U.K. cut subsidies, Mark Group became insolvent and was sold back to management for an "immaterial" price.
- SunEdison won the Invenergy deal after bidding ~$200 million more than the next-highest bidder.
- J.P. Morgan decided not to participate in the First Wind warehouse facility in early 2015 after becoming uneasy with SunEdison's due diligence standards.

Residential

- Residential rooftop had lost money for years and was on track to lose ~$175 million last year.
- The Vivint deal was intended to give SunEdison a successful platform to grow in residential
- The deal went over badly with investors. They worried SunEdison was overpaying and that homeowners were riskier counterparties than the big commercial/industrial customers and utilities that SunEdison had historically worked with.

Latin American Power

- SunEdison took out a $169 million loan from Goldman Sachs in August to be used toward the Latin American Power acquisition, but used it for general corporate expenses.
- SunEdison later failed to complete the Latin American Power deal because it didn't have the money.
- Some senior executives flew to Sao Paolo to try to renegotiate the deal, but were unsuccessful.

Cash

- On Aug. 27, the board had reviewed a presentation showing that SunEdison wasn't expected to be cash-flow positive until the second quarter of 2016.
- By early September, SunEdison's cash balances were less than $300 million.

- It was delaying payments to some suppliers and contractors. Liens had been placed on some projects.
- On Sept. 2, Mr. Chatila was quoted in a Bloomberg article as saying: "The most important question for investors is when do we start generating cash for a living. I have said it's at the end of 2016 or early 2017. But we've been signaling it's going to be a lot sooner than that, probably early 2016 or late 2015."

Uses of Project Debt

- SunEdison used about $24 million in project-finance debt raised for the Del Litoral and El Naranjal in Uruguay for generate corporate purposes.
- SunEdison used about $33 million in project-finance debt raised for the Quilapilum project in Chile for generate corporate purposes.

Q3 Earnings

- On Nov. 10 earnings call, Mr. Wuebbels said the company had "sufficient liquidity." A slide deck said SunEdison had $1.4 billion in cash.
- That figure included cash trapped inside projects for debt service or construction, as well as some part of the First Reserve warehouse, which could not be economically tapped as it cost more than most of SunEdison's projects were yielding.
- A Nov. 10 internal cash report showed available balance of about $90 million.

Executives Raise Concerns

- In October, several senior executives raised concerns to board members including Manny Hernandez, Steve Tesoriere (who I realize is no longer a director) and Georganne Proctor.
- They urged the board to replace Mr. Chatila and to try to raise new capital.
- They told the board they believed the company was misrepresenting its liquidity to investors and its financial health.

- None of those executives is still with the company. They were either fired or quit between October and January.

Nov. 20 board meetings

- SunEdison needed about $100 million to repay a margin loan secured by TerraForm shares and owned by Highbridge Capital Management.
- Mr. Wuebbels had proposed that TerraForm Global prepay $231 million Indian power projects, but the conflicts committee had rejected that transaction.
- Those directors were replaced with three SunEdison appointees and TerraForm's CEO and CFO were fired.
- The new board approved the India transaction and $150 million was transferred from Global to SunEdison to repay the margin loan.

TerraForm has since alleged that SunEdison did not tell its new board about the margin loan or that the old committee had rejected the India deal.

- The TerraForm board pushed Mr. Wuebbels to resign and he did so in late March.

Second-lien debt marketing in December

- According to a presentation to creditors that was later posted on SunEdison's website, the services business was valued at $2.2 billion, based on profits of about $235 million on $443 million in revenue. That profit margin is about 53%. This comes from four revenue line items: O&M, 3rd Party O&M, IPP PPA and SLB (sale-leaseback) PPA.
- An internal budget prepared by management in mid-November did not include IPP or SLB revenues. For the other two line items, it projected $21 million in profit on $133 million in revenue. That profit margin is about 16%.

SunEdison is seeking DIP financing and preparing to file for bankruptcy.

Mr. Chatila last week with some senior managers at the Belmont HQ. He said he had a plan to take the company through a quick restructuring, and that it would emerge stronger than before.

SunEdison held a meeting of senior executives and some board members last June in Paris, hosted at the Park Hyatt Paris-Vendôme where Mr. Chatila presented his vision for the company's future. He predicted that by 2020, SunEdison would have a market cap of >$350 billion by 2020. He said it would eventually manage 100 GW of assets and would one day be as big as Apple or Google.

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